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756 IN RE DIXON [41 C.2d 
Ill. 468, 474 [104 N.E. 829]; Tharp v. Massengill, 38 N.M. 
58, 62 [28 P.2d 502, 94 A.L.R. 726] ; see Union Nat. Bank v. 
Crump, 349 Pa. 339, 343 [37 A.2d 733] .) It is my opinion 
that when, as here, the offer is bona fide and is for the identical 
property, and is by a purchaser able and willing to buy, evi-
dence of the offer should be admitted. Accordingly, the trial 
judge ruled correctly that the witness could mention the offer 
for his property in giving the reasons for his valuation. (See 
Long Beach City H.S. Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Cal.2d 763, 773 
[185 P.2d 585, 173 A.L.R. 249] .) 
Carter, .T., and Schauer, concurred. 
[Crim. No. 5171. In Bank. Dec. 15, 1953.] 
In re CHARLES AUGUSTUS DIXON, on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Habeas Corpus- Writ as Substitute for Appeal.-Habeas 
corpus cannot ordinarily serve as a substitute" for appeal and, 
in absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for 
failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where 
claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised on timely 
appeal from a judgment of conviction. 
[2] !d.-Writ as Substitute for Appeal_:Excuses for Failure to 
AppeaL-Failure of petitioner seeking writ of habeas corpus to 
resort to remedy of appeal cannot be excused on basis of ex-
planation that he lost right to appeal because of his ignorance 
of the law, where he was represented by counsel during all 
stages of trial from arraignment through pronouncement of 
judgment and sentence, and where there is no showing that he 
did not have, or could not obtain, aid of counsel during time 
within which he could have taken an appeal. 
[3] !d.-Petition: Burden of Proof.-Petitioner in habeas corpus 
proceeding has burden of alleging and proving all facts on 
which he relies to overturn judgment of conviction and of 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 4; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus, 
§§ 22, 28. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 5, 7] Habeas Corpus, § 12; [3] 
Habeas Corpus,§§ 51, 60; [4] Habeas Corpus,§ 52; [6, 12J Habeas 
Corpus, § 27; [8] Arrest, § 6; [9, 10] Searches and Seizures, § 1; 
[11] Criminal Law, § 471; [13] Habeas Corpus, §§ 26, 30; [14] 
Habeas Corpus,§ 15; [15] Criminal Law,§ 119; [16, 17] Counter-
feiting, § 1. 
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giving a satisfactory reason for not resorting to his remedy of 
appeal. 
[4] !d.-Petition-Essential Allegations.-In absence of allega-
tions in petition for habeas corpus that petitioner did not 
refuse services of counsel, he is in no position to assert that 
he was ignorant of the law as excuse for not resorting to his 
remedy of appeal. 
[5] !d.-Writ as Substitute for Appeal-Excuses for Failure to 
AppeaL-Allegation in petition for writ of habeas corpus as 
to lack of funds for a transcript raises a false issue and is 
immaterial, since petitioner would have been entitled to a 
transcript of evidence at expense of the state. 
[6] Id.-Grounds-Evidence.-Habeas corpus may not be used 
instead of appeal to review determinations of fact made on 
conflicting evidence after a fair trial. 
[7] !d.-Grounds-Errors and Irregularities.-A writ of habeas 
corpus is not available to correct errors or irregularities 
relating to ascertainment of facts when such errors could and 
should have been raised by appeal, even though alleged errors 
involving factual issues relate to an asserted denial of con-
stitutional rights. 
[8] Arrest-Criminal Cases-Without Warrant.-Where it ap-
pears that police officers went to petitioner's apartment while 
looking for another man, identified themselves as officers, were 
invited by appellant to enter apartment, and one of them, 
standing in an inner doorway and looking into another room, 
observed some of equipment assertedly used by petitioner for 
counterfeiting, they could arrest him without a warrant, they 
having reasonable cause for believing that he had committed 
a felony. (Pen. Code, § 836.) 
[9] Searches and Seizures-As Incident to Lawful Arrest.-Where 
police officers lawfully entered petitioner's apartment on his in-
vitation, it was proper for them, as an incident to lawful arrest, 
to search premises and seize articles which they believed were 
being used by him in commission of crime for which he was 
arrested. 
[10] !d.-Propriety of Seizure.-Action of federal agents in tak-
ing possession of additional evidence discovered in petitioner's 
apartment after their arrival, pursuant to request of police 
officers making arrest, was proper in view of showing that 
such evidence was willingly disclosed to them by petitioner. 
[11] Criminal Law- Evidence- Confessions- Voluntary Char-
acter.-Voluntary character of petitioner's confession follow-
[5] See Cal.Jur., Appeal and Error, § 438. 
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 7 et seq.; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 22 
et seq. · 
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ing his arrest is sufficiently shown by testimony that it was 
freely given and that no force was used on him except for a 
slight scuffle when he vms handcuffed. 
[12] Habeas Corpus-Grounds-Evidence.-Petitioner is not en-
titled in a habeas corpus proceeding to a consideration of 
claims which are based on his version of conflicting evidence 
and which could have been, but were not, raised on appeal. 
[13] Id.- Grounds- Evidence: TriaL-Petitioner's contentions 
that irrelevant evidence was erroneously admitted at his trial 
and that the prosecution was guilty of misconduct could have 
been dealt with on a timely appeal from judgment of convic-
tion, and such matters are not reviewable in a habeas corpus 
proceeding. 
[14] !d.-Grounds-Constitutionality of Statute.-The constitu-
tionality of a statute comes within an exception to general 
rule requiring resort to appeal as a prerequisite to remedy of 
habeas corpus. 
[15] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Acts Violative of State 
and Federal Laws.-A state is not precluded from acting 
with respect to a particular subject merely because power 
over that subject has been expressly granted to Congress by 
the Constitution; the same act may be made a crime by both 
state and federal governments. 
[16] Counterfeiting-Validity of State Legislation.-In absence 
of federal legislation which occupies the field, state legislatures 
have authority to prohibit counterfeiting of federal money. 
[17] !d.-Validity of State Legislation.-Whether Congress has 
occupied a particular field depends on whether it in-
tended to exclude state legislation, and U. S. Code, title 18, 
which relates to federal crimes in addition to counterfeiting, 
and which declares that nothing therein shall be held to take 
away or impair jurisdiction of courts of several states under 
laws thereof, reserves jurisdiction of the states to punish 
counterfeiting. 
PROCEEDING m habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ denied. 
Franklin C. Stark, under appointment by Supreme Court, 
for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Clarence A. 
Linn, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent. 
GIBSON, C. J.-After a trial before a jury in the superior 
court petitioner was convicted of a violation of section 480 
of the Penal Code, which prohibits the making or possessing 
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of dies, plates or other apparatus used in counterfeiting.* 
He was sentenced to San Quentin, where he is now imprisoned. 
No appeal was taken from the judgment of conviction. 
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus and contends, in 
part, that real evidence used to convict him was obtained by 
unlawful search and seizure and that his confession, which 
was received in evidence, was obtained by coercion. In sup-
port of his contentions petitioner makes allegations to the 
effect that police officers and federal secret service agents 
illegally searched his home and seized evidence used against 
him, that he was beaten and threatened, and that his confes-
sion was not made voluntarily. These allegations are contro-
verted by the return, which alleges that all the matters com-
plained of by petitioner were urged and considered at his 
trial in the superior court. 
In view of the fact that petitioner did not appeal we must 
determine whether any of the matters urged by him may 
nevertheless be appropriately considered in this proceeding. 
[1] The general rule is that habeas corpus cannot serve as 
a substitute for an appeal, and, in the absence of special 
circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to employ 
that remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed errors 
could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal 
from a judgment of conviction. (In re Mcinturff, 37 Cal.2d 
876, 880 [236 P.2d 574] ; In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701, 705 
[108 P.2d 10]; see In re James, 38 Cal.2d 302, 309 [240 P.2d 
596]; In re Manchester, 33 Cal.2d 740, 742 [204 P.2d 881]; 
In re Byrnes, 26 Cal.2d 824, 827 [161 P.2d 376]; cf. Brown 
v. AUen, 344 U.S. 443 [73 S.Ct. 397, 420-422, 97 L.Ed. 469] .) 
'l'he only explanation given by petitioner for his failure to 
appeal is that he lost the right because of his ignorance of 
the law and because of a lack of funds necessary to order a 
transcript of the record. 
[2] Petitioner's failure to appeal cannot be excused upon 
the basis of his explanation. He was represented by counsel 
during all stages of his trial from arraignment through pro-
*Section 480 of the Penal Code provides: ''Every person who makes, 
or knowingly has in his possession any die, plate, or any apparatus, 
paper, metal, machine, or other thing whatever, made use of in counter-
feiting coin current in this state, or in counterfeiting gold-dnRt, gold or 
silver bars, bullion, lumps, pieces, or nuggets, or in counterfeiting bank 
notes or bills, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less 
than one nor more than fourteen years; and all such dies, plates, ap-
paratus, paper, metal, or machine, intended for the purpose aforesaid, 
must be destroyed.'' 
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nouncement of judgment and sentence, and there is no show-
ing that he did not have, or could not obtain, the aid of counsel 
during the time within which he could have taken an appeal. 
, Although the application for habeas corpus was apparently 
prepared by petitioner without the aid of an attorney, he is 
now represented by counsel, who argued on his behalf at the 
hearing before this court. No claim has been made, however, 
that his failure to appeal was due to lack of opportunity to 
consult an attorney or that he was in any manner deprived of 
the right to the assistance of an attorney during the time 
within which he could have appealed from the conviction. 
[3] Petitioner has the burden in this proceeding of alleging 
and proving all facts upon which he relies to overturn the 
judgment and of giving a satisfactory reason for not resorting 
to his remedy of appeal. (See In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 
[209 P.2d 793]; In 1·e Manchester, 33 Cal.2d 740, 742 [204 
P.2d 881] ; In 1·e Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701, 711 [108 P.2d 10] .) 
[4] For all that appears petitioner may have refused the 
services of counsel, and, in the absence of allegations to the 
. contrary, he is in no position to assert that he was ignorant 
~f the law. [5] His allegation as to lack of funds for a 
transcript raises a false issue and is entirely immaterial, since 
he would have been entitled to a transcript of the evidence at 
the expense of the state. (People v. Smith, 34 Cal.2d 449 [211 
P.2d 561]; see 4 Cal.Jur.2d 262.) 
We must consider whether, regardless of the lack of a satis-
factory excuse for the failure to appeal, we may properly pass 
upon petitioner's claims relating to forced confession and 
unlawful search and seizure. Petitioner argues that a failure 
to appeal will not prevent a resort to habeas corpus when, as 
here, fundamental constitutional rights are involved. His 
contentions, however, depend entirely on his version of what 
occurred, and, as we shall see, there was ample evidence from 
which the trial court could have found that there was no 
violation of his rights. [6] It is, of course, an established 
rule that habeas corpus may not be used instead of an appeal 
\ to review determinations of fact made upon conflicting evi-
dence after a fair trial. (In re Horowitz, 33 Cal.2d 534, 546 
\(203 P.2d 513]; In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 [177 P.2d 
918].) . [7] Likewise, the writ is not available to correct 
errors or irregularities relating to ascertainment of the facts 
when such errors could and should have been raised by appeal. 
(Of. In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 722 [177 P.2d 918]; In re 
Porterfield, 28 Cal.2d 91, 99 [168 P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675] .) 
, 
1 
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'l'he same principles should apply even though the alleged' 
errors involving factual issues relate to an asserted denial of 
constitutional rights. ( Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 [73 
S.Ot. 397, 421-422, 97 L.Ed. 469] .) It would obviously be 
improper to permit a collateral attack because of claimed 
errors in the determination of the facts after expiration of the 
time for appeal when evidence may have disappeared and wit-
nesses may have become unavailable. 
The clerk's and reporter's transcripts of the proceedings in 
the trial court have been made a part of the record herein, and 
we have examined them to ascertain whether the facts relating 
to petitioner's contentions were before that court and whether 
any error in connection therewith could have been raised on 
appeal. The record shows that the issues relating to the 
confession and the claimed unlawful search and seizure were 
argued during the trial, that the testimony on these matters 
was conflicting, and that the evidence would have supported 
a finding that there was no violation of petitioner's constitu-
tional rights. According to the testimony and the inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, two police officers, who were looking 
for a Mr. Levitt, went to petitioner's apartment and rang 
the bell. They identified themselves as police officers when 
petitioner came to the door, and he invited them to enter. 
While one of them was talking to him, the other, standing in 
an inner doorway and looking into another room, observed 
some of the equipment assertedly used by petitioner for coun-
terfeiting, including a ten dollar bill taped to a printing frame 
before a camera. The officers then arrested and handcuffed 
petitioner, the premises were searched and certain articles 
were seized. The police officers telephoned United States 
secret service agents, and additional evidence was discovered 
after the federal agents arrived, but the record shows that such 
evidence was voluntarily disclosed to the agents by petitioner 
in response to their questions. The officers and agents denied 
that petitioner was beaten or threatened, and there was testi-
mony that his confession was given freely and voluntarily 
and that no force was used upon him except for a slight scuffle 
when he was handcuffed. 
[8] It could be concluded from the evidence that the 
police officers lawfully entered the apartment and that they 
thereafter had reasonable cause for believing that petitioner 
had committed a felony. Hence they could arrest him without 
a warrant. (Pen. Code, § 836.) [9] Thereafter it was 
proper for them, as an incident to a lawful arrest, to search 
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the premises and seize articles which they believed were being 
used by petitioner in the commission of the crime for which 
he was arrested. (Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151 
et seq. [67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399] ; see 79 C.J.S. 795-796.) 
[10] Similarly, the action of the federal agents in taking 
possession of the additional evidence discovered after their 
arrival was proper in view of the showing that such evidence 
was willingly disclosed to them by petitioner. [11] With 
regard to his confession, the testimony as to its voluntary 
character is clearly sufficient. 
It is thus apparent from the record as a whole that the 
matters of which petitioner complains were before the trial 
court and that there was evidence which would have sup-
ported findings that there was no violation of his constitu-
tional rights in connection with his confession or the search 
and seizure. [12] Although difficult questions of law might 
be presented if the facts alleged by petitioner with respect 
to these matters were accepted, he is not entitled in this pro-
ceeding to a consideration of claims which are based upon his 
version of the conflicting evidence and which could have been, 
but were not, raised on appeal. [13] Likewise, petitioner's 
contentions that irrelevant evidence was erroneously admitted 
at his trial and that the prosecution was guilty of misconduct 
clearly could have been dealt with upon a timely appeal 
from the judgment of conviction, and such matters are not 
reviewable in this proceeding. (In re Manchester, 33 Cal.2d 
740, 743-744 [204 P.2d 881]; In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 
723-724 [177 P.2d 918].) 
[14] Finally, petitioner contends that section 480 of the 
Penal Code, under which he was convicted, is unconstitutional. 
This contention comes within a recognized exception to the 
general rule requiring resort to appeal as a prerequisite to 
the remedy of habeas corpus. The decisions involving this 
writ have uniformly passed upon the constitutionality of 
legislation and, in most instances, have done so as a matter 
of course without discussion of the propriety of the writ or 
the availability of an appeal. (See In re Wells, 35 Cal.2d 
889, 892-895 [221 P.2d 947] [considering merits of conten-
tions although noting that they could have been, but were 
not, presented on appeal] ; In re Porterfield, 28 Cal.2d 91, 99 
[168 P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675] ; In re Herrera, 23 Cal.2d 
206, 208, 214 [143 P.2d 345] [no discussion] ; In re Bell, 19 
Cal.2d 488, 492-495 [122 P.2d 22] ; In re Sidebotham, 12 Cal. 
2d 434 [85 P.2d 453, 122 A.L.R. 496] [no discussion] ; 13 
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Cal.Jur. 225-226; cf. In re Leach, 215 Cal. 536, 543-545, 547 
[12 P.2d 3] [stating that it is well settled that constitutionality 
of a law may be raised on habeas corpus] . ) 
Petitioner asserts that section 480 is void because, he argues, 
the United States Constitution gives Congress the sole power 
to punish the counterfeiting of federal currency. Section 8 
of article I of the United States Constitution provides that 
"the Congress shall have power .... To coin money, regulate 
the value thereof, and of foreign coin .... To provide for 
the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and gold coin 
of the United States." [15] A state, of course, is not pre-
cluded from acting with respect to a particular subject merely 
because power over that subject has been expressly granted 
to Congress by the Constitution, and it has been recognized 
that the same act may be made a crime by both state and fed-
eral governments. (California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 731 
[69 S.Ct. 841, 93 L.Ed. 1005] [regulation of interstate com-
merce]; United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381-384 [43 
S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed. 314] [sale of intoxicating liquor]; People 
v. Grosofsky, 73 Cal.App.2d 15, 17 [165 P.2d 757] ; see 15 
Am.Jur. 68.) [16] Although the cases are not entirely 
clear, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that, 
in the absence of federal legislation which occupies the field, 
state legislatures have authority to prohibit counterfeiting of 
federal money. (See Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 319, 322-
323 [23 S.Ct. 543, 47 L.Ed. 833]; United States v. Arjona, 
120 U.S. 479, 487 [7 S.Ct. 628, 30 L.Ed. 728]; cf. Fox v. State 
of Ohio, 5 How. (46 U.S.) 410,432 et seq. [12 L.Ed. 213].) 
In California the case of People v. White, 34 Cal. 183, 186, 
sustained a conviction under a statute similar to section 480 
of the Penal Code for knowingly procuring and possessing 
instruments used in counterfeiting United States gold coin. 
The court rejected an argument that the statute was contrary 
to the federal Constitution, stating· that the United States 
Supreme Court had decided the matter adversely to the views 
advanced by the defendant's counsel. (See, also, People v. 
McDonnell, 80 Cal. 285 [22 P. 190, 13 Am.St.Rep. 159].) 
Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion on the 
ground that the states have concurrent power with the federal 
government unless Congress provides for exclusive federal 
control. (Commonwealth v. Fuller, 8 Met. (Mass.) 313, 314 
et seq. [ 41 Am.Dec. 509] ; Harlan v. People, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 
207, 209-212; Straube v. State, 40 Tex.Crim.Rep. 581 [51 
S.W. 357, 358] ; Martiny. State, 18 Tex.App. 224, 225.) 
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[17] There is no merit to petitioner's contention that 
the field was occupied by the enactment of chapter 25 of 
Title 18 of the United States Code which provides for the 
punishment of counterfeiting and related crimes. Whether 
Congress has occupied a particular field depends upon 
whether it intended to exclude state legislation. (California 
v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728-733 [69 S.Ct. 841, 93 L.Ed. 1003] .) 
Title 18, which relates to other federal crimes in addition 
to counterfeiting, expressly provides that "Nothing in this 
title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction 
of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof." 
(U.S.C.A. § 3231.) Substantially identical provisions in 
former federal statutes have been held to expressly reserve 
the jurisdiction of the states to punish counterfeiting. (Ex 
parte Geisler, 50 F. 411; People v. White, 34 Cal. 183, 186; 
Iowa v. Mc:Pherson, 9 Iowa 53, 55; People v. Fury, 279 
N.Y. 433 [18 N.E.2d 650, 651] ; Strou'be v. State, 40 Tex. 
Crim.Rep. 581 [51 S.W. 357, 358]; see Sexton v. California, 
189 U.S. 319, 322 [23 S.Ct. 543, 47 L.Ed. 833] ; Nastasi v. 
Aderhold, 201 Ga. 237 [39 S.E.2d 403, 405] .) 
The order to show cause is discharged, and the writ is 
denied. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
There can be no question but that the record discloses a 
flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional rights. The 
majority opinion conveys the false impression that the 
officers went to petitioner's home looking for a Mr. Levitt 
and accidentally saw the counterfeiting material and equip-
ment. It is there stated that petitioner invited the officers 
in and that the entry of the police officers was peaceful. This 
is refuted by the statement in respondent's brief that ''In the 
instant case the officers had reason to believe that one Levitt 
had committed a felony and was in the premises. They had a 
right to break and enter in an endeavor to apprehend Levitt." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The majority opinion fails to give the complete factual 
background of this case. It fails to mention that at the 
instigation of the federal officers who made the search, peti-
tioner was charged by a federal grand jury with the same 
crime as is here involved. Upon the trial, in the federal dis-
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trict court, he moved to suppress the evidence which had been 
seized in violation of his constitutional rights; that motion 
was granted by Judge Dal M. Lemmon and it was ordered 
that "The evidence other than the written statement, the 
photographs taken by the officers and the written consent" 
be delivered to the defendant. The evidence so ordered to 
be delivered to petitioner was not delivered to him but to 
police officers of the city and county of San Francisco who 
used it to institute the criminal action in which he was con-
victed. This petition for a writ of habeas corpus stems from 
the judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court of 
the City and County of San Francisco. The charge against 
petitioner in the federal court was dismissed. 
As Judge Lemmon pointed out in his opinion, that any 
invitation by defendant to the officers was in submission to 
authority rather than an intelligent and voluntary waiver of 
his right of protection from illegal arrest or unreasonable 
search and seizure. (Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 
[68 S.Ct. 367, 96 L.Ed. 436] .) It is admitted by the prosecu-
tion that there was a .scuffie when petitioner was handcuffed 
after asking if the officers had a search warrant. Petitioner's 
so-called voluntary oral consent to a search was given while 
he was handcuffed; his written consent to such a search was 
also given while he was handcuffed. For all practical pur-
poses, aside from any force used by the officers, the entry by 
the officers and their search of petitioner's home was illegal 
and in violation of his constitutional rights. As ,Judge 
Lemmon stated, there was present coercion, both physical 
and psychological. Petitioner knew that incriminating evi-
dence had been found; he was handcuffed when his consent 
to a thorough seareh was refused and later gave his con-
sent. A consent given under such circumstances is not the 
consent which the law requires before a lawful search may 
be made. A forced consent is no consent at all. (United 
States v. Baldocci, 42 F .2d 567.) 
In California, due to an unfortunate line of decisions, 
evidence illegally obtained is admissible in the courts. With 
these holding I have always been in disagreement. (See 
dissenting opinion in People v. Rochin, 101 Oal.App.2d 140, 
143 [225 P.2d 1, 913]; reversed by United States Supreme 
Court, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96 
L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396] .) I have always taken the 
position that the decisions of this court have given aid 
and comfort to so-called officers of the law who are so lacking 
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in respect for the constitutional provisions here involved that 
they ruthlessly violate them with impunity. To them the con-
stitutional right of privacy does not exist, and they make an 
empty, hollow mockery out of the oath which they took to 
support the Constitution. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides that ''The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated . ... " (Em-
phasis added.) The same provision is found in the Cali-
fornia Constitution, article I, section 19. The federal courts 
have refused to allow this right to be violated. I wish I 
could say the same thing for the courts of California. We 
are told by a majority of this court that the action of the 
federal agents in taking possession of additional evidence 
discovered after their arrival was proper in, view of the 
showing that such evidence was willingly disclosed to them 
by petitioner. This is in conflict with the decision of Judge 
Lemmon who held' that the evidence was illegally obtained 
and ordered it returned to defendant. His decision on this 
issue is final and should be res adjudicata. It is ignored 
by the majority. The evidence is uncontradicted-in fact 
it is admitted-that at the time the search was made petitioner 
was handcuffed. It would appear to me that one who is hand-
cuffed is not in a position to do anything willingly. We are 
also told that evidence was voluntarily disclosed by peti-
tioner. This so-called voluntary disclosure was also made 
after he was handcuffed. In view of the foregoing it is 
perfectly obvious that the search and seizure were unlawful. 
As Mr. Justice Douglas said in McDonald v. United States, 
335 U.S. 451 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153] : "We are not 
dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant 
serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the 
Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the 
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals 
nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. 
It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need 
to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right 
of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the dis-
cretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the 
arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history 
shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. 
And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the 
desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the 
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home. We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement 
and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing 
by those who seek exemption from the constitutional man-
date that the exigencies of the situation made that course 
imperative." (Emphasis added.) 
In this record I find no evidence that such an emergency 
existed as to excuse the procurement of a search warrant 
and Judge Lemmon so held. It is also my opinion that, under 
the fact presented here, to hold that petitioner "willingly" 
and "voluntarily" permitted the officers to search and seize 
evidence found in his home is a travesty upon the accepted 
meaning of those words. 
The majority here disregards the mandate of both the 
federal and state Constitutions that the right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects shall 
not be violated, and sanctions the violation of these mandates 
on the ground of expediency. 
It is indeed regrettable that the majority of this court 
has again seen fit to perpetuate a rule which permits peace 
officers to flout these constitutional mandates. This rule 
was first pronounced by this court in People v. Mayen, 188 
Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383], which was followed 
by the cases of People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal.2d 165 [124 P.2d 
44], and People v. Kelley, 22 Cal.2d ] 69 [137 P.2d 1]. 
Abuses which have been practiced under this rule have been 
declared by the Supreme Court of the United States to be of 
such gravity and so inhuman as to shock the conscience of 
mankind and that ''this course of proceeding by agents of 
government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even har-
dened sensibilities.'' (See Rock in v. California, 342 U.S. 
165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396] .) While 
the reversal of this court by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the Rochin case was not based upon the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States but upon 
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to that Constitution, it cannot be denied that had the 
courts of California followed the federal rule with respect 
to excluding evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful 
search and seizure, the Rochin case would never have occurred 
and this court would have escaped the censure implicit in 
the following statement in the Rochin case at page 174: 
"In deciding this case we do not heedlessly bring into ques-
tion decisions in many States dealing with essentially dif-
ferent, even if related, problems. We therefore put to one 
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side cases which have arisen in the State courts through use 
of modern methods and devices for discovering wrongdoers 
and bringing them to book. It does not fairly represent 
these decisions to suggest that they legalize force so brutal 
and so offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from 
a suspect as is revealed by this record. Indeed the California 
Supreme Court has not sanctioned this mode of securing a 
conviction. It merely exercised its discretion to decline a 
review of the conviction. All the California judges who have 
expressed themselves in this case have condemned the con-
duct in the strongest language." It should be noted that the 
statement in the above excerpt that "the California Supreme 
Court has not sanctioned this mode of securing a conviction," 
is not a correct statement, as the Rochin case was before this 
court on a petition for hearing after decision by the District 
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, and that petition 
was denied by the vote of every member of this court except 
Justice Schauer and myself who wrote dissenting opinions to 
the order of denial. (See People v. Rochin, 101 Cal.App.2d 
140, 143, 149 [225 P.2d 1, 913] .) 
It cannot be denied that it lies within the power of a 
majority of this court to change the rule which permitted and 
encouraged the shocking and inhuman conduct of peace offi-
cers depicted in the Rochin case and in the case at bar. 
The courts of last resort of many other states have seen fit to 
adopt and follow the federal rule relating to the admissibility 
of evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search and 
seizure. 
On December 6, 1950, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in 
the case of Rickards v. State, overruled two prior decisions 
of that court and adopted the federal rule with respect to the 
inadmissibility of evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful 
search and seizure; that is, search without a search warrant. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware is reported 
in 6 Terr. (Del.) 573 [77 A.2d 199]. In the course of its 
opinion in this case, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated: 
"It would serve little purpose to catalog numerous decisions 
of State and Federal Courts discussing the rule. There is a 
direct conflict between the respective points of view; they are 
irreconcilable. 
''Courts admitting such evidence, while recognizing the 
existence of the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable 
search and seizure and compulsory self-incrimination, never-
theless, hold that the protection of those guarantees does not 
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require evidence obtained in violation of them to be excluded. 
In answer to the argument that the guarantees have been 
violated by state officials, it is said that the state, itself, has 
committed no violation because it adopts as its acts only the 
legal acts of its officials, and that officials who illegally violate 
constitutional guarantees do so on their own initiative and 
not under the sponsorship of or for the benefit of the state. 
'fhe remedy of the individual whose rights have been violated 
is stated to be a civil action against the official who has invaded 
his constitutional rights. 
"Courts following the Federal rule adopt the view that 
the efficient prosec,ution of criminals cannot justify a deliberate 
invasion of the right of the C'itizen to be made secure against 
the violation of specific constitutional guarantees, and that the 
suggested remedy of a civil action is as a practical matter no 
remedy at all. The Federal rule is a practical attempt to 
help preserve the constitutional gtuarantees. 
"We prefer the rule followed in the Federal courts. We 
conceive it the dtdy of the courts to protec.t constit?dional 
guarantees. The most effective way to protect the guarantees 
against tmreasonable sea1·ch and sei.zttre and compulsory self-
incrimination is to exclude f1·om evidence any matter obtained 
by a violation of them. 
"We believe that as long as the Constitution of this state 
contains the gtwrantees to the citizen refetYed to, we have 
no choice but to use every means at our disposal to preserve 
those gttarantees. Since it is obviatts that the exclusion of such 
matters from evidence is the most pra,ctical protection, we 
adopt that means. It is no answer to say that the rule hampers 
the task of the prosecuting officer. If forcecl to choose between 
convenience to the prosectttor and a deprivation of constitu-
tional gtwrantees to the citizens, we in fact have no choice. 
Moreover, within constitutional limits, the Legislat1tre may 
change the ntles defining the limits of legal police action. 
It may well be that the Leg1:slattr1·e will desire to reconsider 
Section 5173 and Section 5683 in the light of modern needs. 
"\Ve, accordingly, are of the opinion that State v. Chtwhola, 
S1tpra [2 W.W.Harr. 133 (120 A. 212)], and State v. Epis-
copo, supra [7 W.W.Harr. 439 (184 A. 872)], were errone-
ously decided and overrule them. The proper rule to be 
applied in the criminal courts of this state is that evidence 
obtained by a violation of constitutional guarantees is inad-
missible at the trial of the person whose guarantees have been 
41 C.2d-25 
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violated, if timely objection is made thereto. We suggest the 
adoption of an appropriate rule by the Court of General Ses-
sions to cover the subject. Cf. Rule 41 (e) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. 
"The conviction of the plaintiff in error is reversed." (Em-
phasis added.) 
In view of the foregoing I would grant the writ here prayed 
for and discharge the petitioner from custody. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the reasoning and in the conclu-
sion stated by Justice Carter. 
[Sac. No. 6286. In Bank. Dec. 16, 1953. J 
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[1] Insurance-Beneficiaries-Nature of Beneficiary's Interest.-
The position of beneficiary named in insurance policy subject 
to change by insured is similar to that of beneficiary of will, 
a mere expectancy dependent on designation at time of in-
sured's death. 
[2] Husband and Wife- Property Settlement Agreements- In-
terpretation.-Where property settlement agreement covers 
all property of the parties, and wife, in accepting certain 
provisions for her benefit, fully releases husband with respect 
to all other property, such release ordinarily covers and in-
cludes her interest as designated beneficiary on insurance 
policy; but where language is not broad enough to encompass 
such an expectancy or an intent appears to exclude such rights 
as present part of settlement, wife may still take as bene-
ficiary if policy so provides. 
[3] !d.-Property Settlement Agreements-Interpretation.-In in-
terpreting property settlement agreements, courts weigh care-
fully language employed by the parties in measure of re-
nunciation of their respective rights; general expressions or 
clauses are not to be construed as including an assignment 
or renunciation of expectancies, and a beneficiary therefore 
[1 J See Cal.Jur., Insurance, § 120; Am.Jur., Insurance, § 127 4 
et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 45; Am.Jur., Husband 
and Wife, § 318 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Insurance,§ 221; [2, 3, 5, 6] Husband 
and Wife, § 157 ( 6) ; [ 4] Insurance, § 225. 
